Watching video "Declining Labor Shares and Bargaining Power: An Institutional Explanation"

Themes: Economics   English   seminar   HSE   2009  
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We model the design of labor market institutions in an economy characterized by moral hazard and irreversible investment. In this setting the institutional design affects the bargaining power of labor. At the optimum, the allocation of bargaining power balances the aforementioned frictions. We examine the impact of improved monitoring and investigate the implication upon labor share, effort and investment. The model's predictions are consistent with recent decreasing labor shares and wages per effective labor units observed in most OECD countries. It is also consistent with rising labor productivity and declining ratio between effective labor and capital found in many of these countries.

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